



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ADVANCING ON DIFFICULTIES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HARDING CARTER, U. S. A.

To comprehend the operations of the War Department today, one must possess some familiarity with the things that have gone before. Throughout our history all our wars have been fought under the volunteer system, with all its attendant political and local influences. As a result of analysis of the past experiences of the nation, the opinion was general among military students that we should do away with the volunteer system and provide for the creation of a National Army, based upon the principle of universal military obligation. With the passing of the Civil War the belief prevailed that a nation possessed of two or three million men who had recently experienced military service in the field would be free from attack by any other nation or combination of nations, and it was quite impossible for the experienced generals of that conflict to exercise any material influence in making immediate provision for the future. For forty years this feeling continued to exist in our country and prevented any serious consideration of a modern military organization. The war with Spain found us still imbued with the ideas of 1861 so far as the organization of armies and the conducting of war are concerned. We proceeded to call for volunteers and took into service such minor parts of the militia as volunteered as organized bodies for service in that war.

The experiences of the nation in the war with Spain were not such as to give serious cause for rejoicing. No nation in Europe was less fitted to go to war at that time than Spain. Any of the modern military nations relying upon universal military service in the creation of their armies would have caused a very different termination had they been engaged with us in 1898. It is extremely fortunate

for the nation that the lessons of that war were taken seriously to heart by military men and that they continued in and out of season, at every opportunity, to propound the doctrine that the obligations of citizenship included those of readiness to defend our liberties. While the sum total of success along these lines was not very great, as the result of much argument and pleading, Congress was induced to grant some of the powers which were so earnestly asked for by the War Department. It should be remembered, however, that Congress has steadily refused in recent years to heed the advice of military men to grant the large appropriations necessary to provide modern artillery and other instrumentalities of war which require a long time to produce. Even when war was declared, appropriations for the necessary preparations came slowly.

The creation of the Army War College in 1901 and the enactment of the provision for a General Staff in 1903, were the foundation stones on which we now rely for all the plans of organization and campaign with which we are about to enter the European conflict. The marked difference between our conduct of the present war and those which have occurred in the past is the businesslike way in which we are now proceeding to organize our armies upon a modern basis, and to arm and equip them in a manner which will give them an equal showing with the very efficient enemy with whom they are to contend for the mastery in France and Belgium. We had but recently reorganized the army upon the basis of the best military judgment for service on this continent, but the commissioners sent by the Allies to confer with this Government advised some temporary rearrangements for the trench warfare of the Western front. The necessity for a reorganization arose from the experience in the trenches where attacks with bombs, grenades and gas have become the ordinary and habitual means of fighting.

Interchangeability of ammunition demands modification of American firearms and consequent delay. It ought to be apparent to reasonable men that in preparing to fight with the Allies on the same front and practically in the same lines, interchangeability of ammunition is not only desirable but absolutely essential. In the minds of military men the delay to obtain this is justified from the point of view of business efficiency. These and many other things have been and are being done to insure victory, but neither in detail

nor in whole has it been possible to make a public exhibit of all this work of preparation.

In the organization of the army which we are now sending to France, we will have Regulars, National Guard of the States called into the Federal service, and the National Army created by the draft. If the futility of this combination shall become apparent to all those who desire to have the nation's armies of the future organized in the simplest, most efficient and economical manner, the war will not have been in vain. The lessons already learned point definitely to such a reorganization when the war is over as will give a body of regulars to perform the police duties of peace with a sufficiently large skeletonized army to train and receive annually the young men of military age who should be prepared in time of peace to fulfill the important duties of war, and thereby save the abnormal expenses involved in hastily creating the great war machine which we are now undertaking to make available for the emergency. This does not involve militarism in the slightest degree.

To the trained military student, the course of the nation during the past few years, when confronted with the question of preparing for our possible entrance into the war, has been most pathetic. The long campaign of the pacifists led by well known men, many of them in public office, had cast a web of confusion over the minds of a considerable number of our people. The influence of this movement was apparent in much of the action of Congress during the three years' war in Europe, when we were on the verge of being forced into that conflict at every hour of the day. The resultant effect was to prevent the nation from adopting a reasonable system of military preparation, in the absence of which we have been forced to adopt all sorts of expedients and hurried measures of training.

In our nation there can never be that unanimity of purpose and patriotic feeling concerning war or any other great question, such as is found among other nations in which racial homogeneity prevails. With the great mixture of races in America have come many of the prejudices of the older nations, and the failure of recent immigrants to scatter broadcast through the country and become Americanized through association with natives stands in the way of the highest fulfillment of promise. Of these and the descendants of former immigrants the citizenship of our States is

comprised. In many instances the foreign born and the children of foreign born parents constitute fifty per cent or more of the population of States. We have become accustomed to the use of the term "melting pot" when referring to the absorption of the overflowing mixture of races. It has become a question of deepest import that the basic element in and around the melting pot shall be one in which Americans of long established lineage shall preponderate. Otherwise the melting pot may produce a citizenship which neither comprehends nor venerates the sacrifices which were made by our forebears in the establishment of representative and constitutional government on this continent. The danger may be comprehended by an examination of the nationalities comprised in the pay roll of one of our large industrial plants of the Middle West for the month of August, 1917, showing the nationality and fluctuation of employes during that period:

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Total at 1st of Month</i>	<i>Entering</i>	<i>Leaving</i>	<i>Total at end of Month</i>
American	1522	234	301	1455
Albanian	1	1
Austrian	91	15	16	90
Arabian	1	1
Armenian	142	54	75	121
Assyrian	1	2	1	2
Belgian	1	1	..	2
Bulgarian	17	4	5	16
Bohemian	4	9	2	11
Canadian	22	1	1	22
Croatian	280	106	66	320
Danish	9	3	1	11
English	28	8	4	32
German	49	6	6	49
Greek	641	167	197	611
Hollander	3	3	1	5
Hungarian	361	63	59	365
Irish	43	9	10	42
Italian	48	14	6	56
Jewish	11	2	2	11
Lithuanian	71	18	10	79
Norwegian	5	1	1	5
Polish	608	127	166	569
Persian.	1	1
Roumanian.	1252	137	187	1202
Russian	31	28	23	36
Scotch	28	2	2	28
Serbian	253	100	98	255
Slavish	249	39	46	242

<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Total at 1st of Month</i>	<i>Entering</i>	<i>Leaving</i>	<i>Total at end of Month</i>
Spanish	8	2	2	8
Swede	68	9	16	61
Swiss	1	1
Welsh	9	1	1	9
Colored	433	259	356	336
Finlander	1	..	1
French	2	..	1	1
Mexican	19	4	15
	<hr/> 6294	<hr/> 1444	<hr/> 1666	<hr/> 6072
Total entering.....				1444
Total leaving.....				<hr/> 1666
Loss				222

Military students are confident that out of universal obligation to serve the Nation in war and the preparation beforehand to render such service, will come an influence tending to ameliorate the conditions resulting from too much segregation and isolation of foreign born men within our borders.

It cannot fail of recognition that many complications have arisen and will continue to arise through our failure to provide a national army before the crisis of war arrived. This failure is due to two causes, the opposition of the National Guard Association, and the inability of a majority of Congress to bring themselves to the belief that we were at the threshold of war. The trouble began some years ago when the active militia organizations secured a change of title to National Guard for the State troops. The writer has frankly contended for years that the title was a misnomer and a stumbling block in the path of a correct solution of our military problems.

It has been made apparent in many States that the departure of all the organized militia leaves the field open to disorders of all kinds and that this condition may be accentuated as the war progresses. A very few States have attempted to solve the problem by the creation of a constabulary, but there has been no uniform plan proposed or adopted. In more than four-fifths of the States the Legislatures meet once in two years and very few have annual sessions.

A correct military system would permit only those citizens who by reason of age or physical condition are not qualified for military service, to enter the State force, which

should be in name and character Home Guards, not National Guard. The support of the nation's army should fall equally upon all the people. This is not the case under the existing system because some States are heavily taxed for brigades and divisions, while some have practically no tax for State troops.

In the past, few National Guard regiments have been able to attain the strength regarded as essential for proper drill and training. In war it will be necessary to make up the deficiency by assignment of drafted men. It will be quite impossible for those who have been associated with the original National Guard organizations to render justice to the drafted men in the distribution of offices. Political authorities are quite certain to continue their interest in the wishes and welfare of the National Guard, without any corresponding interest in the drafted men.

It is certain that the National Guard organizations will give a good account of themselves in the war, individually and collectively, and that they will come home with an *esprit de corps* exalted by the ordeal of battle and the hardships of campaign. This, to them, happy result will make it all the more difficult to secure a correct American military system, for our political history establishes that where one Congressman will study and vote for a measure of national welfare, nine will endeavor to so align their action that they will not offend any organization of men within their districts. This is entirely human and one of the evils of the elective system which must be accepted with the innumerable benefits of representative government. The army and the National Guard have never been aligned under the banners of any party, and National Guardsmen have never been won from their individual political faith although their ballots have been brazenly sought on occasions in return for political assistance in matters of legislation.

These are mere suggestions of the things encountered by a nation which has refused to listen to those who have urged preparation for the inevitable conflicts which the working out of the destiny of a people enforces upon them. There is no cause to be disheartened. On the contrary there is much to be thankful for. Under the volunteer system no American general was ever able to bring a reasonable proportion of his army to the battlefield at the critical moment. Under the draft system, with the strategy of the coming

war in the hands of the General Staff, and the munitions safeguarded by groups of patriotic men selected by reason of recognized and proved business ability, it is made certain that the nation will steadily move forward to a condition of preparation which will enable it, not only to take its place in the battle lines of the Allies, but to stay there performing its full share in breaking down the human wall which must be crushed before the German people will feel the need for peace upon the terms which will be demanded and enforced by practically all the other civilized nations. Anything short of this accomplishment will fail to satisfy civilization for the interruption of its upward course. Then will come a readjustment of the affairs of the nations whose financial and blood sacrifices have both drained and ennobled them. Our soldiers will come home from the war uplifted by the knowledge of having rendered the state some service in the hour of world peril and they will be better Americans for it.

WILLIAM HARDING CARTER.